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AN UGLY FAMILY:  WHY THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCH
DOCTRINE IS AN UNFORTUNATE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DEVELOPMENT THAT SHOULD BE RESTRAINED
Aubrey H. Brown III*
INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”1  Since 1974, the Supreme Court, utilizing the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness language, has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
allow third parties validly to consent to police searches that target another individual’s
privacy interest.2  The Court’s third-party consent search rulings essentially allow third
parties to waive another person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches.3 
The practical effect of these Fourth Amendment rulings is to diminish significantly
an individual’s right to privacy in his living quarters if that individual takes on a room-
mate4 or grants access to someone whom law enforcement officers reasonably could
mistake as having authority to consent to a search.5
The Supreme Court, in a unique moment of Fourth Amendment clairvoyance,
attempted to return some abrogated Fourth Amendment protections when it decided
Georgia v. Randolph.6  The problem with the decision, however, is that the Chief
Justice’s dissent was the correct analysis of the Court’s precedent, and the majority,
in order to reach a desirable result in the case, circumvented existing doctrine and
created a new standard by which Fourth Amendment reasonableness is to be mea-
sured.7  This new standard, “widely shared social expectations,”8 further confuses
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2010; B.A., Hampden-Sydney College, 2007.
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974).
3 See, e.g., id. at 171 n.7 (stating that a third party may consent to a search targeting another
party when the third party has “joint access or control [of the property] for most purposes”).
4 See id.
5 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–89 (1990).
6 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
7 See id. at 120 (holding “that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over
the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable
as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident”).
8 Id. at 111.
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third-party consent doctrine and leaves room for widespread abuses of the Randolph
decision and the Fourth Amendment.9
In many respects, Randolph left third-party consent jurisprudence in worse
shape than it was before the Court’s decision, but the majority’s validation of an
individual’s right against warrantless searches of the home seems to be the correct
Fourth Amendment intuition.  Frankly, there is something inherently wrong with a
warrantless police search of an individual’s home when conducted in the face of an
express objection by the individual against whom the search is conducted.  This type
of police action pricks our sense of Fourth Amendment righteousness—and rightly
so.10  Not having the votes necessary to reinvent third-party consent search doctrine,
but willing to reinvigorate Fourth Amendment values, Justice Souter crafted a “fine
line” opinion capable of jamming Randolph’s unique fact pattern into the existing
doctrine without disturbing the current framework of third-party consent.11  Alas, as
all children learn at a young age, the square peg may be hammered through the round
hole, but both the peg and the hole will get mangled in the process.  In this same manner,
the Court jammed Randolph into the third-party consent framework and as a result
both were mangled.
This Note uses Georgia v. Randolph as a tool to show why third-party consent
doctrine is broken and what can be done to repair it.  By tracing the evolution of cur-
rent third-party consent doctrine, pointing out its flaws, and offering two different
proposals that could reinforce our current notions of Fourth Amendment values, this
Note attempts to offer a remedy for the doctrinal inconsistencies within third-party
consent jurisprudence and vindicate the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Note recites the current state of third-party consent jurisprudence
and points out its inconsistencies and its practical limitations as a safeguard of Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.  Part II explains how third-party
consent searches gained constitutional validity by examining three important Fourth
Amendment doctrines enabling third-party consent.  Part III proposes that the Supreme
Court should use Randolph as a springboard to reestablish some form of primary
party “waiver” standard in third-party consent search jurisprudence in order to lend
credibility and give efficacy to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protecting values. 
The first proposal is to abolish third-party consent as a constitutional doctrine.  The
9 See George M. Dery, III & Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme
Court’s Signal to Police in Georgia v. Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Search from
All Occupants of a Home, 40 CONN. L. REV. 53, 74–83 (2007).
10 We cannot, however, blame law enforcement for encroaching on privacy because their
duty is to enforce the law within the liberty-preserving constraints of the Constitution as inter-
preted by judges.
11 See Randolph, 574 U.S. 103. Justice Kennedy’s opinion and questioning at oral argu-
ment in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002),suggest why Kennedy voted with the
majority. Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 63–67 (2008) (explaining Justice Kennedy’s conception of
a valid consent search).
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second proposal is less radical:  create a first-party primacy standard through which
the party targeted by a law enforcement officer for a search receives special consider-
ations before a third-party would be permitted to consent to that search.
I. THIRD-PARTY CONSENT:  STATE OF THE LAW AND ITS FLAWS
A Harvard note writer, summarizing scholars’ perception of the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, described the Court’s work as “‘shifting, vague,
and anything but transparent’12. . . ‘a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is
not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse’13 and ‘for clarity and con-
sistency . . . not the Supreme Court’s most successful product.’”14  Scholarly com-
mentary on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is just as unflattering in the specific
arena of consent search doctrine.15  Part I will examine the scholarly criticisms of
basic consent search doctrine, recite the state of third-party consent search jurispru-
dence before Randolph, summarize and critique Randolph, and discuss Randolph’s
inability to protect individuals’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. 
The doctrinal problems created by Randolph will later be used to highlight the fact
that significant changes are necessary in third-party consent jurisprudence.16
A. Scholarly Criticisms of Basic Consent Search Doctrine
Any discussion of third-party consent search jurisprudence must at least briefly
point out the scholarly criticisms of basic consent search doctrine for the simple reason
that if consent searches are not constitutionally valid, then third-party consent searches
are overwhelmingly invalid.  Thus, debate over the constitutional validity of consent
searches immediately places inherent skepticism into the constitutional validity of
third-party consent searches.
There are two major scholarly criticisms of consent search doctrine.  First,
scholars argue that consent searches are not supported by the Constitution on their
12 See Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (2007)
(quoting Lloyd L. Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of Presence Under the Fourth
Amendment, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 253).
13 Id. (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 758 (1994)).
14 Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 349 (1974)).
15 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois
v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (arguing that the
Supreme Court ignored precedent when it decided Rodriguez); Maclin, supra note 11, at 27
(suggesting that the “Court’s consent search doctrine [is] both straightforward and bewildering
at the same time”); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
211, 271–72 (2002) (calling for the abolition of consent searches).
16 See infra Part I.C–D.
474 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:471
face because “reasonable” searches are founded on probable cause, and consent
does not, per se, provide law enforcement officers with the requisite probable cause
to validate a search.17  Second, condemning the weak standard of “voluntariness”
by which courts determine the validity of a person’s consent,18 scholars question
whether an individual’s consent can ever be genuinely voluntary in the face of gov-
ernment authority.19  If consent cannot possibly be given voluntarily in the face of
government authority, then all consents are coerced, which renders all consents con-
stitutionally invalid.20
The doctrinal justifications for targeted-party consent searches have been roundly
criticized.  Keep in mind that third-party consent is a doctrinal offshoot of basic first-
party (targeted-party) consent.  Any doctrinal weaknesses present in targeted-party
search doctrine necessarily exist in third-party consent doctrine.  Third-party consent
by definition is a weaker doctrine because it not only inherits the weaknesses of
targeted-party consent, but it must bear criticism for its own inherent weaknesses,
which will be the discussion of the rest of Part I.
B. Third-Party Consent Search Jurisprudence Before Randolph
Three cases define the parameters of third-party consent search jurisprudence: 
United States v. Matlock,21 Illinois v. Rodriguez,22 and Georgia v. Randolph.23  The
bulk of the work in the arena of third-party consent is performed by Matlock because
it sets the standard by which third-party consent validity is measured.
Matlock was the Court’s first case to validate and legitimize third-party consent
searches of a defendant’s living quarters.24  Law enforcement suspected that Matlock
had robbed a Wisconsin bank.25  Police officers came to the home where Matlock
lived and arrested him in the front yard.26  The officers then proceeded to ask another
resident of the home, Gayle Graff, if they could search the home, and she consented.27 
The officers searched the home and found $4,995 in cash in the closet of the bedroom
17 See George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches,
73 MISS. L.J. 525, 548–49 (2003).
18 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223–34 (1973) (defining “voluntary”
in consent search context).
19 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 28 & n.6; Strauss, supra note 15, at 236–44.
20 Or at a minimum, informed consent. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 236–44, 256–58,
271–72.
21 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
22 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
23 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
24 See infra  n.230 and text accompanying notes 194–230. But see Matlock, 415 U.S. at
169–71 (stating that the third-party consent issue had been decided previously).
25 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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that Graff and Matlock jointly occupied.28  The Court had to determine whether
Graff could validly give consent to a search of the bedroom, and the Court ruled that
she could.29
The Court held that Graff’s consent to the search was valid, even though it tar-
geted Matlock.30  The Court prefaced its ruling on the notion that Graff had actual
authority to give consent:  “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority
over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared.”31  “Common authority” is not established by any law
of property; rather, “common authority” is established by “joint access or control for
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the
risk that” one of their co-inhabitants will consent to a search.32  Thus, the right to con-
sent to a search does not lie with the person against whom the search is targeted, but
rather lies with any person who has authority to consent by virtue of his relationship
to the targeted premises.
The Court extended Matlock’s third-party consent search rule in Rodriguez to
allow for police error in assessing “common authority” in the field by permitting
third parties to consent validly to a search if police officers reasonably believe that
the third party possesses the authority to permit a search.33  Gail Fischer had been
severely beaten by Edward Rodriguez.34  She led police officers to Rodriguez’s apart-
ment, where she provided them with a key to the apartment and implied joint occu-
pancy when she “referred to the apartment . . . as ‘our[s].’”35  The police, without
arrest or search warrants, entered the apartment and saw, in plain view, significant
amounts of cocaine and drug paraphernalia.36  During all of this activity in his apart-
ment, Rodriguez was asleep in his bedroom.37  The officers arrested Rodriguez and
confiscated the drug evidence, which was used to charge him with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver.38
In circuit court, Rodriguez successfully contested the search in order to suppress
the evidence by showing that Fischer did not possess the authority to consent to the
search.39  The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied
28 Id. at 166–67.
29 Id. at 167, 177.
30 See id. at 171 & n.7.
31 Id. at 170.
32 Id. at 171 n.7.
33 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990).
34 Id. at 179.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 180.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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the state’s leave to appeal.40  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Illinois courts.41  The Court rested its decision on Fourth Amendment
reasonableness by ruling that warrantless police searches are reasonable when law
enforcement officers receive consent from a third party, but only if the officers reason-
ably believe in good faith that the consenting third party has the authority to consent.42 
In Rodriguez, the officer’s belief that Fischer had the power to consent was reasonable
because she had a key to the apartment, referred to the apartment as “our[s],” and told
the officers that she had clothes and furniture in the apartment.43
Since Rodriguez, third-party consent search analysis has contained two tiers.  First,
a court must determine whether the consenting party possessed common authority
over the area subjected to the search.44  If so, then the search was valid.45  If not, the
court determines whether the law enforcement officers executing the search reason-
ably believed that the third party possessed common authority over the area subjected
to the search.46  If the answer is yes, then the search is valid.47  If the answer is no, then
the search is invalid.48
The first tier of this analysis examines the relationship between the third party
and the targeted search area.  For example, in Matlock the question of the search’s
validity turned on the relationship between Graff and the home.49  The second tier
of analysis examines the relationship between the third party and the police officer’s
subjective interpretation of the third party’s relationship to the targeted search area. 
For example, in Rodriguez the question of the search’s validity turned on whether the
police officers believed the third party had the power to consent.50  Neither of these
tiers of analysis considers the defendant’s ability or opportunity to invoke his Fourth
Amendment rights.  Neither Matlock nor Rodriguez was asked whether they would
permit a police search despite the fact that both were on their respective premises and
easily accessible to the officers.51  Ultimately, the defendant is the target of the search
40 Id. at 180–81.
41 Id. at 181, 189.
42 Id. at 185–86.
43 Id. at 179.
44 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974).
45 See, e.g., id.
46 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183–89.
47 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 686–87 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that evi-
dence was sufficient for trial court to hold that police reasonably believed the third party had
common authority and thus power to consent to a search).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1996) (ruling that search
was invalid because officer could not have reasonably believed the third party had power to
consent).
49 See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 168.
50 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183–89.
51 Rodriguez was asleep on his bed, id. at 180, and Matlock was outside in a police car,
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
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and has everything to lose by exposing his privacy, but his fate lies in the hands of
another who presumably has no interest in opposing the search.
A good pre-Randolph criminal procedure exam question might try to provoke
students by asking “what happens when two people, each with equal authority to con-
sent to a search, stand at the threshold of a residence and give opposite answers to a
search request made by a police officer?”  An astute answer would point out that the
question is novel because Matlock only controls when the defendant is not present, but
the student, by extending Matlock’s logic, may conclude that the search was valid be-
cause the consenting party’s power to consent is not a waiver of the objecting party’s
Fourth Amendment rights.  The consenting party’s power to consent derives from that
party’s “own right” stemming from her joint access and control over the property sub-
ject to the search, and the objecting party assumed the risk that the consenting party
would consent to a search.  The answer would go on to conclude that the objecting
party had no right to stop the consenting party from consenting.52  The circuit courts
that answered this hypothetical exam question before Randolph answered the same
way as the astute student.53  The Georgia courts and a majority of the Supreme Court
saw the issue differently and attempted to restrict the scope of third-party consent
in Randolph.54
C. Summary and Critique of Georgia v. Randolph
Janet Randolph had been living with her parents for several weeks when she
returned with her son to the marital home.55  Scott Randolph, Janet’s husband, took
the child to a neighbor’s house following a domestic dispute, which prompted Janet
to call the police.56  When officers arrived, Janet claimed that Scott used cocaine.57 
The officer asked Scott if he could search the home and Scott “unequivocally re-
fused.”58  The officer then asked Janet, and she consented.59  Janet led the officers to
Scott’s bedroom where they seized a cocaine-laden drinking straw, which was used
to obtain a search warrant.60  The subsequent search turned up more evidence of
cocaine use.61  Scott was indicted for possession of cocaine, but he moved to suppress
52 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
53 United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 534–36 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1152 (1996); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687–88
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
54 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23; State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004),
aff’d, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
55 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
56 Id. at 107.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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the evidence based on the warrantless search.62  The trial court denied Scott’s sup-
pression motion by finding that Janet possessed common authority over the area
searched.63  The court of appeals reversed and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
by distinguishing Matlock as applicable only when the defendant is absent.64
Rejecting the Georgia Supreme Court’s simple and effective differentiation strategy,
the U.S. Supreme Court took a different approach by analyzing the facts against the
backdrop of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and creating a “widely shared social
expectations” standard to evaluate reasonableness.65  Under the social expectations
standard, it was unreasonable for the police to search the home because no regular
house guest would feel comfortable entering the home when one tenant welcomed
the guest and the other asked the guest to leave.66  The Court did not overrule Matlock
or Rodriguez; the Court admittedly drew a “fine line”67 in order to give efficacy to
an individual’s assertion of his right, while simultaneously preserving the current
framework of third-party consent search doctrine and servicing pragmatism in real-
world police investigations.68
The Court’s essential ruling—a tie goes to the objector, so long as the objector
is “at the door” and “objecting”69—is odd given the doctrinal rationale for third-party
consent.70  Matlock teaches that a person with joint access and control of a common
area may permit the police to search that area.71  The validity of third-party consent
arises from the relationship between the consenting third party and the targeted search
area or, in a case like Rodriguez, the relationship between the third party and the third
party’s relationship to the targeted search area as determined by a police officer’s sub-
jective analysis.72  In either circumstance under the pre-Randolph precedent, the de-
fendant had no ability to overcome the third party’s right to admit the police.  Whether
the defendant was present or absent, he had no objection because he had “assumed
the risk” that his co-tenant would admit the police.73  In order for the Randolph major-
ity to invalidate the search, the Court had to ignore precedent and come up with a
62 Id.
63 Id. at 107–08.
64 Id. at 108.
65 Id. at 111.
66 Id. at 113–14.
67 Id. at 121.
68 Id. at 121–22.
69 Id. at 121.
70 See id. at 137 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s rule arbitrary and
obscure).
71 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
72 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990).
73 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. In many pre-Randolph third-party consent cases the de-
fendant was present in the normal sense of the word, yet the defendant’s presence never made
any difference in the outcome of the case. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180 (defendant
asleep in bedroom); Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166 (defendant arrested and placed in squad car).
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different mode of analysis for situations where the defendant is present and objecting—
enter “widely shared social expectations” analysis.74
The “widely shared social expectations” standard of evaluating third-party consent
situations is weak to say the least.  The social expectations standard for determining
the reasonableness of a search cheapens the Fourth Amendment’s value as a liberty-
preserving device by allowing judges to make bold assumptions about relationships
between co-inhabitants and their individual privacy expectations.75  The social expec-
tations standard of review strips the Fourth Amendment of any real protection in the
arena of third-party consent searches.
This point is made perfectly clear in the Chief Justice’s dissent.76  Chief Justice
Roberts simply argues that there are social situations where a guest, such as a good
friend or an out-of-town visitor, would enter the home of disputing residents.77  Analyz-
ing the facts of Randolph under any of these examples could lead to an opposite ruling
in a case with identical facts to Randolph.  Chief Justice Roberts’s argument shows that
the “widely shared social expectations” standard is no standard at all because of the
complexities of human relationships and social expectations.78  Any judge could easily
dispense with a challenge to a third-party consent search by juxtaposing the facts of
the case with some socially acceptable situation in which a guest would enter:  any
social expectation becomes “widely shared” when a judge puts pen to paper.
Furthermore, the “widely shared social expectations” standard of reasonableness
and the theory that co-tenants “assume the risk” that the other co-tenant may permit
a search do not necessarily coexist in harmony.  For example, suppose that Anne and
Bob are married, reside in an apartment, and sleep in the same bedroom.  Anne and
Bob mutually share the social expectation that either of them might rifle through the
other’s things or enter any room in the apartment, and that is a risk they understand
and are willing to take.  If, however, Anne has friends over for tea and crumpets, Bob
has the social expectation that Anne will not parade the guests around the whole apart-
ment, and Anne’s friends certainly do not expect to have the opportunity to rifle through
Bob’s personal things.  Rather, the occasion will be contained in the living room,
dining room, kitchen, or some other appropriate room for the event.
The widely shared social expectation is that co-tenants will not let outsiders rifle
through their roommate’s personal things.  Anyone who has cohabitated with another
person understands that there has to be mutual trust and respect between the co-
tenants as to their individual privacy and personal belongings.  If guests were to come
74 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111.
75 See Monique N. Bhargava, Note, Protecting Privacy in a Shared Castle: The
Implications of Georgia v. Randolph for the Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1009, 1021–22 (2008).
76 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 129–30 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
77 Id. (mentioning good friends, out-of-town visitors, layout of the property, and ratio of ob-
jectors to willing hosts as examples of social situations where different standards should apply).
78 See id.
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to the apartment and ask Anne if they could rifle through Bob’s things, Bob’s social
expectation is that Anne will refuse, and Anne, one could argue, has a social duty to
protect Bob’s privacy interest while he is away.  Because of their shared social expec-
tation of privacy, the only risk Bob thinks he has assumed is the risk as to Anne, not
as to other house guests or certainly not as to the police.  Bob would expect Anne to
vindicate his Fourth Amendment right and protect his privacy against any visitor to
the apartment because he would do the same thing for Anne, or at least she would
have the expectation that he would defend her privacy.  No cohabitant has the social
expectation that his roommate will let others search through his personal things.
Of course, if a reader disagrees with this analysis of what constitutes “widely
shared social expectations,” then he has proven the first, and more important, point: 
the “widely shared social expectations” standard is no standard at all because its defi-
nition changes depending on who you ask.  Furthermore, no surefire method exists
to objectively and accurately determine which social expectations are widely shared.79
Notwithstanding its faults, the great success of Randolph is that it exposes the in-
equity of third-party consent doctrine.  Before Randolph, a defendant, the person whose
privacy, liberty, and literal freedom were at stake, received no consideration in the deter-
mination of whether a police search was valid.80  Rather, a third party with no skin in
the game could decide the fate of the defendant by deciding whether to preserve or
waive the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.  Should
not the defendant make that important decision to consent?  Randolph takes the first
step toward answering “yes” by saying that when the defendant is present, the defen-
dant gets the opportunity to object to a law enforcement officer’s request for consent
to search.81
The fact that the Randolph decision flies in the face of third-party consent doctrine
shows that a defendant’s autonomy to waive a right and third-party consent doctrine
cannot logically coexist.  Again, Chief Justice Roberts explained this incongruence
when he wrote that “the majority’s rule protects . . . not so much privacy as the good
luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the door when the police arrive.”82 
Basically, the Chief Justice highlighted the fact that the Court has never considered
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right in a third-party consent context, and there
is no reason to start considering it now.83  Either the Fourth Amendment should be
considered from the defendant’s perspective or it should not, but it is arbitrary to con-
sider the defendant’s interests at some times and not at others.  When confronted with
the prospect of completely eliminating a defendant’s right to object to a search when
he shares his privacy with another, the Court could not follow its precedent to its
79 There is also the question of how widely a social expectation must be shared before it
is “widely shared.”
80 See discussion supra Part I.B.
81 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
82 Id. at 137 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 127–28.
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logical conclusion.  This failure to logically extend Matlock’s doctrinal rationale
forces the consideration of this question:  can third-party consent, as it is currently
administered, comport with the Fourth Amendment, whose purpose is to protect the
people’s privacy from government intrusion?
Even though the Randolph majority failed to create a meaningful standard and
write an opinion cohesive with precedent, they should be applauded for their at-
tempt to constrain third-party consent.  Despite the Court’s noble efforts to restrain
Matlock and Rodriguez, Randolph’s “fine line” proved to be too fine in subsequent
appellate court decisions.84  However, Randolph highlights the inherent problems with
third-party consent and may be used as a springboard to restrain that line of Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
D. Randolph’s Practical Limitations in Protecting Fourth Amendment Rights
Ultimately, Randolph has added little, if any, Fourth Amendment protection.85 
Practically speaking, Randolph resembles an invisible line rather than a fine line because
only the Ninth Circuit has buttressed the decision with some real enforceability.86 
Strict interpretation of Randolph in other circuits has allowed law enforcement officers
to avoid its mandates.87
The Randolph majority sent a warning to law enforcement officers looking to
game the “present and objecting” criteria of Randolph:
So long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the
potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoid-
ing a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple
clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s
permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other
according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary
indication when he expresses it.88
Unfortunately for the Fourth Amendment, the majority of lower courts have read the
“present and objecting” criteria very narrowly.89  This trend allows police officers
84 See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
85 See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 9, at 83–84.
86 See United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an
objection to a search is infinite unless waived).
87 See discussion infra Part I.D.
88 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121–22.
89 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding search valid
despite fact that police arrested defendant after he had expressly objected to the search and
obtained consent from his wife); United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding
search valid despite defendant’s present objection to same search two weeks earlier because
defendant was not present or objecting when police returned), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1312
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to employ tactics to avoid Randolph’s mandate.  Officers may avoid asking a present
defendant for permission to search and instead ask a third party.90  Officers may ask
for defendant’s consent, but then arrest the defendant when he refuses, ask the third
party, and carry out the search anyway.91  Officers may wait until they know that the
defendant will not be home, and then ask the present third party.92  All of these tactics
fly in the face of the Fourth Amendment and highlight the weakness of the “fine
line” rule of Randolph.93
The Seventh Circuit has been particularly brazen with its narrow reading of
Randolph.  In an opinion by Judge Rovner, the Seventh Circuit ruled in United
States v. Groves that a search was valid when the defendant unequivocally refused
several requests by police officers to search his home in connection with reported gun-
fire in his neighborhood.94  The officers even requested a warrant from the magis-
trate, which the magistrate denied.95  But these officers would not be deterred; they
waited several weeks and returned to Groves’s home when they knew he would be
at work.96  They asked Groves’s girlfriend, Foster, if they could search the home.97 
Foster testified that the officers threatened to remove her child to Child Protective
Services if she did not consent, but the district court refused to accept her testimony
as fact.98  Foster consented to the search, and the police found the evidence they were
looking for and used it to convict the defendant of certain gun charges.99  It seems
unjust on its face to circumvent the defendant’s express objection to a search of his
home by waiting for him to go to work and ambush his girlfriend, particularly when
a magistrate agreed that there was no probable cause.  The Seventh Circuit had no
problem refusing to invoke Randolph:
(2009); United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding search valid despite
the fact that defendant objected because defendant was not present at search location when
he objected); United States v. McKerrell, 491 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
defendant did not object despite the fact that he barricaded himself in his home denying police
entry), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 553 (2007). But see Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (holding search
invalid because objection was registered prior to third-party’s consent).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding search valid
where defendant’s girlfriend consented to search after defendant’s arrest).
91 See, e.g., Henderson, 536 F.3d at 777–78, 785 (holding search valid despite defendant’s
express objection and subsequent removal by arrest).
92 See, e.g., Groves, 530 F.3d at 508, 511–12 (holding search valid when police officers
returned two weeks later when defendant, who had expressly objected to the same search
earlier, was not home).
93 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
94 Groves, 530 F.3d at 508.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 508–09.
99 Id. at 509.
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Groves was not objecting at the door, as Randolph requires. 
Indeed, a few weeks had passed since he had refused the officers’
first attempts to obtain his consent.  Moreover, that the govern-
ment agents waited until Groves was at work to seek Foster’s con-
sent did not undermine the validity of the search because they
had no active role in securing Groves’ absence.100
The Seventh Circuit reached this result by diminishing the significance of Groves’s
previous objection and narrowly construing both the “present and objecting” criteria
and the rule against procuring the absence of the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of third-party consent jurisprudence is clear: 
if you want to vindicate your Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches,
do not cohabitate, and if you do, never leave home or always take your roommate with
you.  The fact that the officer played no active role in securing Groves’s absence should
not be dispositive if the officer intentionally approached the home knowing he was
at work.  The officers constructively removed the defendant from the entrance by in-
tentionally timing their intrusion with his absence.  This is the failure of an analysis
based on the “social expectations” test.  If one of Foster’s friends came over for some
afternoon tea and crumpets, despite the express objection of Groves on a previous
occasion, Foster’s friend would still feel welcome if Groves was not present; thus,
the police, like the friend, can gain access despite a previous express objection because
there are no social mores forbidding the intrusion.
Even Groves’s author, Judge Rovner, could not approve of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Henderson.101  Officers responded to a call of domestic
violence at the Henderson home.102  Patricia Henderson had been choked and locked
out of the house before the police arrived.103  Patricia’s son arrived with a key and the
police used it to enter the home.104  Officers found Kevin Henderson sitting in his
living room and, “[a]fter a brief exchange, Henderson told the officers to ‘[g]et the
[expletive] out of my house.’”105  The officers arrested Henderson for domestic bat-
tery and took him to the police station.106  Meanwhile, an officer asked Patricia if they
could search the home.107  She consented and the police conducted a search that turned
up “crack cocaine and drug-dealing paraphernalia, four handguns, a shotgun, a rifle,
100 Id. at 512.
101 United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 785–88 (7th Cir. 2008) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
102 Id. at 777 (majority opinion).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 777–78.
106 Id. at 778.
107 Id.
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a machine gun, and live rounds of ammunition . . . a machete, a crossbow, and . . .
an M-1000 explosive device.”108
The court interpreted the brief dialogue between Henderson and the officers as
an objection to a search, so the court had to determine whether Randolph applied.109 
The majority ruled that Randolph did not apply because Henderson was not “present”
and “his objection lost its force” when police received consent from Patricia.110  Based
on the “social expectations” analysis of Randolph, the search in Henderson was reason-
able because once Henderson was gone, there was no reason why it would not be
socially acceptable for Patricia to welcome in a guest.111  Furthermore, after Henderson
was arrested and removed, he was no longer present and objecting at the threshold
of the home.112
The practical effect of this decision is that a defendant’s objection to a warrantless
search is effective only if he is not arrested and removed.  In other words, if a defen-
dant can be legally arrested, he has no Fourth Amendment right to object to the search
of his home.  If the police can legally remove the objecting party from the threshold,
then they may act upon the consent of the third party despite a previous objection. 
Judge Rovner pointed this out in his dissent: “There is one and only one reason that
this case is not on all fours with Georgia v. Randolph: When Kevin Henderson told
the police to ‘get the fuck out’ of his house, the officers arrested and removed him
instead.”113  Rovner went on to say, “I would hold that Henderson’s objection sur-
vived his involuntary removal from the home, thus precluding the search in the absence
of a warrant.”114  Rovner’s dissent is consistent with Randolph’s preclusion of police
action that is intended to remove the targeted party from the threshold.115
Judge Rovner’s dissent in Henderson mirrored what the Ninth Circuit had ruled
a few months earlier in United States v. Murphy.116  Wayne Murphy was a metham-
phetamine manufacturer living and working out of a storage unit, which he had per-
mission to use from Dennis Roper, whose name was on the lease and who paid the
rent.117  Police officers came to the storage units and confronted Murphy, who ob-
jected to a search of the unit.118  The officers arrested Murphy and took him to jail.119 
108 Id.
109 Id. at 779–85.
110 Id. at 785.
111 Id. at 783–84.
112 Id. at 785.
113 Id. at 785–86 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 786.
115 Id. at 787–88; see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
116 Compare Henderson, 536 F.3d at 786 (Rovner, J., dissenting), with United States v.
Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2008).
117 Murphy, 516 F.3d at 1119.
118 Id. at 1119–20.
119 Id. at 1120.
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Two hours later, Roper arrived at the unit, and officers asked him if they could search
the unit.120  Roper consented and the police found an operational methamphetamine
lab inside.121  Murphy filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on an illegal
search.122  The district court denied the motion, but the Ninth Circuit, using Randolph
as its justification, reversed.123
The Ninth Circuit interpreted broadly the Supreme Court’s warning to police
about avoiding objections:
If the police cannot prevent a co-tenant from objecting to a search
through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and then seek
to ignore an objection he has already made.  Nor, more generally,
do we see any reason to limit the Randolph rule to an objecting
tenant’s removal by police.  Once a co-tenant has registered his
objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective barring
some objective manifestation that he has changed his position and
no longer objects.124
This broad interpretation of Randolph provides more Fourth Amendment protection.125 
The broad interpretation can easily be circumvented if police officers avoid asking
defendants for consent by simply arresting them first and asking for the co-tenant’s
consent or arriving at the targeted residence knowing that the suspect will not be
home.  These types of tactics have proven successful in several circuits.126
Even though Randolph recognizes that defendants should have some capacity
to successfully object to a search, Randolph does little to give defendants the practical
legal tools necessary to enforce that right without broad interpretation by circuit courts. 
Frankly, if the police can legally arrest the defendant and the defendant has a co-tenant
willing to consent to a search, the defendant loses his Fourth Amendment right against
searches.  Similarly, if the defendant has registered his objection to a search, the
police can circumvent that objection simply by waiting until the defendant is not home
and asking the defendant’s roommate for consent.  Even more simply, law enforce-
ment officers may not ask the defendant at all despite the fact that he is the target of
the search.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1119.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1124–25.
125 For further analysis of the narrow vs. broad interpretation of Randolph, see Renee E.
Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph: Dueling Approaches
to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937, 952–57 (2007).
126 See supra Part I.D.
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E. Summary
Randolph created a useless standard to reach a result that did not follow the
Supreme Court’s precedent.  Despite its failures, the Court’s decision as to the outcome
of the case has opened the door for welcome restraint on third-party consent.127  The
Ninth Circuit has shown how lower courts, and eventually the Supreme Court, can
use Randolph as a springboard to further restrain third-party consent.128
The remainder of this Note focuses on how and why third-party consent gained
validity, why third-party consent does not comport with our current understanding
of the right to privacy, and what courts can do to rectify these injustices.
II. DOCTRINES ENABLING THIRD-PARTY CONSENT
The government’s revenue officers arrived at the defendant’s home and place of
business while he was away.129  The defendant’s wife answered the door, whereupon
the officers informed her that they had come to search the residence for “‘violations
of the revenue law.’”130  The defendant’s wife allowed the warrantless officers to enter
the residence and conduct their search against the defendant-husband.131  The revenue
officers found the incriminating evidence they were looking for and later used it to
convict the defendant at trial.132  The Supreme Court addressed these events in 1921,
eighty-five years before Randolph, and the Court, avoiding the question of whether
a wife could “waive” her husband’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, found the
search to be invalid and ordered the return of the defendant’s illegally distilled whis-
key because of the “implied coercion” used by the officers against the wife to gain
entry into the home.133  Because of the implied coercion, the Court determined that
“no . . . waiver was intended or effected.”134
In 1974, the Court in United States v. Matlock returned to the question it left
open in Amos:  “The question now before us is whether the evidence presented by
the United States with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search the
living quarters of the respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials
admissible in evidence at the respondent’s criminal trial.”135  The Court answered
in the affirmative,136 but in the years between Amos and Matlock, the Court’s Fourth
127 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 67–82.
128 See Murphy, 536 F.3d at 1124–25.
129 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315 (1921).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 317.
134 Id.
135 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974).
136 See id. at 169–72.
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Amendment doctrine had changed significantly.137  Three shifts in Fourth Amendment
doctrine enabled the Court to validate third-party consent searches: a shift from pro-
tecting an individual’s interests in property to protecting an individual’s “right to
privacy”;138 a shift from “warrant preference” theory to a more “generalized reason-
ableness” theory;139 and the demotion of Fourth Amendment rights to a lower tier of
protection by the elimination of “waiver” from the Fourth Amendment lexicon.140
A. Property vs. Privacy
The first shift in Fourth Amendment doctrine that enabled the creation of third-
party consent occurred in 1967 when “the Fourth Amendment’s concern with pri-
vacy . . . achieved preeminence in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United
States.”141  Prior to Katz, the Court decided search cases based on property interests.142 
Olmstead v. United States is an example of such a case.143  The Court upheld a gov-
ernment wire tap because there was no government trespass to the defendant’s personal
property.144  Dissenting in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis expressed his concern that the
majority was not taking into account the characteristics of the blossoming telecommuni-
cations era and that a doctrine limiting the Fourth Amendment to property interests was
not broad enough to provide individuals with the privacy the Founders intended to
enshrine in the amendment.145  The Court adopted the notion of privacy in subsequent
137 See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway:
A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 725–37, 745–48
(2007); Maclin, supra note 11, at 35–63.
138 See Bascuas, supra note 137, at 733–37; compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928) (holding the Fourth Amendment only protects an individual’s property rights),
with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment also protects
an individual’s privacy interest).
139 See Bascuas, supra note 137, at 745–57; compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (holding that every search must be authorized by a warrant), with Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177 (1990) (holding that a warrantless search can be valid if police officers have a
reasonable belief a third party has given consent).
140 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that the State need not
prove that a person giving consent to search knew he had a right to withhold consent); Davies,
supra note 15, at 31.
141 Bascuas, supra note 137, 735–36; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
142 See Bascuas, supra note 137, at 733–34.
143 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding no search occurred when law enforcement officers eaves-
dropped on a phone conversation because there was no trespass to property).
144 Id. at 455.
145 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
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decisions, culminating with the Katz decision.146  Presently, the Fourth Amendment
is interpreted primarily as protecting the right to privacy rather than property.147
The caveat to the argument that the shift from property to privacy allows for third-
party consent is that third-party consent is possible in a property regime.  In a property
regime, third-party consent would be valid when the consenting individual has some
current possessory ownership interest in the property subject to a search.  The differ-
ence between third-party consent searches in a privacy rather than property regime
is that the universe of individuals capable of consenting to a search is broader in a
privacy regime.  To exemplify the difference between the universe of valid consenters
in property and privacy regimes, it may be helpful to look at cases decided before Katz
and imagine possible third-party consenters in a post-Katz privacy regime based on
a broad assumption of the risk analysis.
Stoner v. California, decided before Katz, involved a robbery suspect, Stoner,
whom police believed to be residing in a hotel room.148  The police arrived at the hotel
without a warrant and made a request of the night clerk to search Stoner’s room.149 
The night clerk obliged the officer’s request, and the officers found seven items of
incriminating evidence, which were used to convict Stoner.150  The Supreme Court,
rejecting the State’s arguments attempting to show that an exception to the warrant
requirement existed, reversed the conviction—the most important argument rejected
being the argument that the night clerk could validly consent to the officer’s search.151 
The Court acknowledged that hotel room renters understand that some hotel employ-
ees may access rooms in order to fulfill their duties of employment, but the Court re-
jected any “strained applications of the law of agency or [any] unrealistic doctrines
of ‘apparent authority.’”152  Instead, the Court applied a strict waiver standard.153
By straining assumption of the risk analysis, however, the housekeeping staff
could become valid consenters in a privacy regime.  Interpreting assumption of the
as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
146 Katz, 389 U.S. at 355; see Bascuas, supra note 137, at 736 (“Katz expressly overruled
Olmstead and entrenched the right to privacy as the [Fourth] Amendment’s chief concern.”).
147 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.3, at 554–55 (4th ed. 2004). This Note does not propose returning to a property regime.
See infra Part III. But see Bascuas, supra note 137, at 769–75 (suggesting a return to stronger
property protections).
148 376 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1964).
149 Id. at 485.
150 Id. at 485–86.
151 Id. at 489 (“It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner’s constitutional right
which was at stake here, and not the night clerk’s nor the hotel’s. It was a right, therefore, which
only the petitioner could waive.”).
152 Id. at 488.
153 Id.
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risk analysis liberally, a court could validate the search because the defendant exposed
his privacy to the housekeeping staff and assumed the risk that the housekeeping staff
would rifle through his things or invite others to his room when he refrained from
placing a “Do Not Disturb” sign on his room’s doorknob.  A member of the house-
keeping staff could transfer his access rights to the police just as easily as he could
report contraband to the police if he saw it in the room.  Although this construction
of assumption of the risk analysis strains credulity, the point is that members of the
housekeeping staff could never be valid consenters in a property regime because they
have no property interest in the hotel room.  Only the owner of the hotel could be
a potential consenter, and his right to consent would be constrained by property and
contract law.
Another case, Chapman v. United States, involved a landlord-tenant relation-
ship.154  The landlord suspected that his new tenants were illegally distilling whis-
key.155  The landlord called the police, who entered the home through an unlocked
window.156  The officers discovered the illegal distillery, contacted federal agents, and
arrested Chapman when he returned.157  Chapman successfully argued that the search
was invalid because it was warrantless, and the landlord could not have given con-
sent to the search.158  The government argued that the landlord had the right, which
was transferable to the police, to enter the leasehold based on a Georgia statute that
allowed landlords to re-enter the property if it was being used for distilling whiskey.159 
The Court disagreed because the landlord had only a suspicion, not actual knowledge
of the distillery’s presence, so the statute did not apply.160  Thus, the decision rested
on property law, which removed the landlord from the universe of consenters even
though he was the owner of the property.
If the decision was made in a privacy regime and decided by a court that construed
assumption of the risk liberally, then that court may have upheld the search.  Because
landlords typically reserve the right of occasional inspection, the government could
argue that the renter had assumed the risk that the landlord would bring the police
along to one of these inspections.  The tenant would not be able to object because he
assumed the risk that the landlord would take such action.  This is the theory, taken
to extremes, enunciated by the Court in Matlock:  once A shares his privacy with B,
A assumes the risk that B will expose A’s privacy to whomever B might choose.161 
One’s privacy rights are compromised once the privacy is shared with a third party. 
The Court has given the effect of law to the old axiom “the best kept secrets are those
kept by one person.”
154 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
155 Id. at 611–12.
156 Id. at 612.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 616–18.
159 Id. at 616–17.
160 Id. at 617.
161 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
490 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:471
These examples, though extreme, show that, in the third-party consent context,
Fourth Amendment rights in a privacy regime are fragile and easily shattered when
compared to Fourth Amendment rights in a property regime.  Property rights are well-
defined and not up for interpretation by the Supreme Court, or at least not nearly to
the extent of privacy rights.  Privacy rights in third-party consent context are defined
by how far the Court is willing to take the assumption of the risk doctrine in the future.
When Justice Brandeis espoused his view of privacy in Olmstead, he envisioned
a broader Fourth Amendment.162  Generally speaking, the Court’s shift from a Fourth
Amendment property regime to a Fourth Amendment privacy regime has expanded
the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  However, in the context of third-party consent,
the privacy regime reduces the protections of the Fourth Amendment because assump-
tion of the risk analysis creates a broad universe of potential consenters.  When coupled
with the reasoning in Rodriguez—allowing for police error—the universe of consenters
is potentially anyone.163  Because the Court adopted the privacy regime to broaden
the Fourth Amendment’s protections, the Court should place limits on the extent to
which privacy can erode Fourth Amendment protections in the third-party consent
context in order to preserve the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protecting purpose.
B. Warrant Requirement vs. “Reasonable” Exceptions (Excuses)
The second shift in Fourth Amendment doctrine that enables constitutional
validation of third-party consent searches is a shift in the interpretation of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.  The Fourth Amendment protects “the people” from
“unreasonable searches.”164  Unreasonable searches are constitutionally invalid and
evidence seized from such a search is excluded from evidence at trial.165  In the days
of Amos, virtually all warrantless searches were considered unreasonable and invalid.166 
“During the heyday of the warrant requirement, the Court repeatedly insisted ‘that
[warrantless] searches . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”167 
Searches with a warrant satisfied the reasonableness requirement, and warrantless
searches typically did not satisfy the reasonableness requirement.168  Reasonableness
was not defined by judges analyzing the facts of a given situation; rather, reasonable-
ness was defined within the strict parameters of the warrant requirement.169
162 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
163 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
164 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
165 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
166 See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393–94.
167 Maclin, supra note 11, at 32 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 437, 357 (1967)).
168 See, e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. 383.
169 See, e.g., id.
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Today, “the ‘warrant requirement’ [has] become so riddled with exceptions that
it [is] basically unrecognizable.”170  Furthermore, “the Court has become increasingly
deferential to government interests.”171  As mentioned in Part II.A, the Court’s cur-
rent Fourth Amendment framework emerged from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz:  “My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”172  Justice Harlan’s analysis gave rise to what is known
as the reasonable expectation of privacy test.  The test is used to determine whether
a Fourth Amendment search has taken place, which is not an inconsequential determi-
nation because where there is no search, there is no Fourth Amendment application.173
The devil in warrant requirement degradation is the Court’s current predilection
to analyze Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” in light of specific case facts and con-
cerns with practicality.174  Justice Scalia admitted the role of reasonableness in break-
ing down the warrant requirement in California v. Acevedo:  “Our intricate body of
law regarding ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ has been developed largely as a
means of creating these exceptions [to the warrant requirement], enabling a search
to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ and therefore not subject to the
general warrant requirement.”175  If the Court can come up with a reason that justifies
a warrantless search as reasonable, then the search is valid.
Built into Harlan’s test is the notion that an individual’s privacy exists only in-
sofar as society is willing to acknowledge that the individual’s privacy expectation is
reasonable.  “[I]t is clear that social convention has become the defining ideal of the
Fourth Amendment—the source of authority that gives reasonableness its shape.”176 
The problem with reasonableness defined by social convention is that its shape is
amorphous, not easily predictable, and changes over time with the rotation of the
Justices and their current predilections.  The very reasonableness that enables the via-
bility of third-party consent also justifies the limits to third-party consent enunciated
in Randolph.177  Furthermore, the social expectations test’s lack of definitional cer-
tainty can be seen in Chief Justice Robert’s use of his own views of social expectations
in his Randolph dissent to give reasonableness a radically different definition.178
170 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
see Note, supra note 12, at 1628.
171 Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function
of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2198 (2006).
172 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
173 Note, supra note 12, at 1628 (“[T]he central question in the context of any warrantless
search is whether a search occurred at all.”).
174 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); see also Davies, supra note 15,
at 45–69.
175 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
176 Note, supra note 12, at 1628.
177 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111–12 (2006).
178 See id. at 129–30 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The combination of defining reasonableness with social convention and using
reasonableness to erode the warrant requirement enables the constitutional validity
of third-party consent.  First, erosion of the warrant requirement enables the Court
to determine that warrantless searches conducted with consent are not unreasonable
and may not even be characterized as a Fourth Amendment search.  Second, the Court
interprets reasonableness to allow law enforcement officers to validly search a person’s
living quarters when a third party in his own right consents to a search based on the
assumption of the risk doctrine.179  Today, a warrant is not a requirement, but rather
one method of making a search reasonable, and individual rights against unreason-
able searches are subject to change, for better or worse.180
The Court’s doctrine on Fourth Amendment reasonableness weakens the Fourth
Amendment by incentivizing police tactics designed to circumvent the Fourth Amend-
ment.181  These tactics are exemplified by the cases cited in Part I.  The Court should
reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment by taking positive steps to remove incentives for
police officers who presume to dodge the Fourth Amendment’s proscriptions.
C. Demotion of Fourth Amendment Rights: “Waiver’s” Disappearing Act
Perhaps the most significant development that enabled the Court to approve third-
party consent searches was the demotion of Fourth Amendment rights from the top
tier of constitutional protections.182  The Court effected this change in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.183  “Schneckloth edited ‘waiver’ out of the Court’s vocabulary of syno-
nyms for consent to avoid any suggestion that consent required a warning of the right
to withhold consent.”184  The significance of this development for third-party consent
jurisprudence cannot be understated: without waiver’s disappearance from the Fourth
Amendment lexicon, third-party consent is not possible.  If consent searches were
considered a waiver of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, third parties could
never waive the rights of the targeted party because individuals can only waive their
own rights, not the rights of others.185
If consent is not a waiver, then the question, “who consented?” is of no import. 
The question becomes, “did the person who gave consent have the power to do so?” 
The suspect’s rights get lost in the analysis when the question is not, “who consented?”
but, “is the power valid?”  The third party’s valid consent circumvents the suspect’s
interest in protecting his privacy, weakening the Fourth Amendment.  This Fourth
179 Id. at 111–12 (majority opinion).
180 See Davies, supra note 15, at 36–40; Thomas, supra note 17, at 544.
181 See Dery & Hernandez, supra note 9, at 83–84; Maclin, supra note 11, at 81–82;
Strauss, supra note 15, at 236–44.
182 See Davies, supra note 15, at 46.
183 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
184 Davies, supra note 15, at 31.
185 Id. at 26–30.
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Amendment weakening is enhanced because the third-party in many cases will have
no motive to object to a search targeting another person because the third party pre-
sumably has nothing to hide.  These circumstances lead to affirmative answers in re-
sponse to third-party search requests, which can partly explain why police officers
prefer consent searches to all other forms of Fourth Amendment search validation
methods: it’s quick, easy, and sure to work.186  The targeted party always has a keen
interest in objecting to the search, but without a strict waiver standard, the primary party
will never get the opportunity to object if law enforcement officers are well-trained.
How did the Court in Schneckloth make waiver disappear before our very eyes? 
Schneckloth involved the search of a car during a routine police stop.187  One of the
passengers consented to a general search of the car.188  The search uncovered stolen
checks, and those checks were used to convict another passenger, Bustamonte.189  The
main question facing the Court was whether consent, in the Fourth Amendment con-
text, is a waiver in the strict sense of the word, requiring “‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’
waiver,”190 or whether consent should be judged by a different standard.191  The im-
plication of deciding that consent was, in fact, a waiver in the strict sense of the term
was that the Court would have been forced to write another Miranda-like opinion,
requiring officers to inform individuals of their right to refuse a request to search.192 
The Court was unwilling to make that move, so it swept the term “waiver” out of the
Fourth Amendment lexicon and iterated the voluntariness standard.193
The Court accomplished this by distinguishing the Fourth Amendment from other
amendments.194  The “rejection of the formal concept of waiver for Fourth Amend-
ment consent rests on a premise that Fourth Amendment rights are of a different, and
lower, order than those rights set out in other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”195  The
Schneckloth majority determined that the Fourth Amendment did not deserve a strict
waiver standard because it was not a trial right, and only trial rights had received a
strict waiver standard.196  Thus, the Fourth Amendment was undeserving of height-
ened protections granted to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in Miranda.197
186 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 31–32, 81–82.
187 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220–21.
188 Id. at 220.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 236.
191 Id. at 222.
192 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Maclin, supra note 11, at 54–55.
193 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218; see also Maclin, supra note 11, at 54–55. For the
purposes of this Note, the Court’s choice to implement the voluntariness standard is immaterial.
What is important is that consent is not a waiver.
194 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235–46.
195 Davies, supra note 15, at 31 n.114.
196 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236–37.
197 Id. at 241 (“There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial
and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
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How the Court can conclude that the Fourth Amendment has “nothing whatever
to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial”198 is bizarre. 
Like a confession or other admission by a defendant, evidence seized during a police
search can be used against a defendant at his trial.  The defendant can challenge evi-
dence by challenging the validity of the search that produced such evidence.  These
objections occur at trial.  The Fourth Amendment in this respect protects elements
of the defendant’s privacy from being revealed at trial unless the search was valid. 
The entire reason why seized evidence is used is to ascertain the truth.  The Fourth
Amendment has a direct effect on the outcome of a trial.  When third parties consent
to a search, that consent abrogates the defendant’s ability to challenge the search at
trial, which directly results in admissible evidence against the defendant.
Aside from demoting the Fourth Amendment, the Court used another tactic to
complete waiver’s disappearing act: the misinterpretation of precedent.  In Schneckloth,
the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment contained no waiver requirement be-
cause holding so would directly contravene the Court’s third-party consent decisions.199 
The Court’s analysis of its own precedent is far too sweeping and broad because no case
had been decided before Schneckloth strictly on third-party consent grounds.200  The
Court cited Frazier v. Cupp,201 Coolidge v. New Hampshire,202 Abel v. United States,203
and Hill v. California204 to show that the Court had previously sanctioned third-party
consent searches.205  The problem is that none of these cases are third-party consent
cases in the strict meaning of the term.206  The Court also ignored cases such as Stoner,
which assert that there is some form of waiver standard in the Fourth Amendment.207
The search in Abel took place in a hotel room that had been rented by the
defendant.208  The police requested permission from hotel management to search the
defendant’s room.209  The Court upheld the search because the defendant had already
checked out of the room, abandoning his right to privacy, and the evidence was found
in the trash can, which meant the property seized was abandoned.210  The search was
not a third-party consent search; the search was a first-party consent search because
198 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 245–46.
200 Id.
201 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
202 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
203 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
204 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
205 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245–46.
206 “[T]he typical third party consent case, [is] where the police solicit the consent of A in
order to search an area in which B has a privacy interest for the express purpose of finding
evidence against B.” 4 LAFAVE, supra note 147, § 8.3(a), at 147.
207 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
208 Abel, 362 U.S. at 241.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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the hotel had acquired complete access and control of the room.211  Defendant had no
expectation of privacy in the room he no longer rented, and the defendant no longer
had any property interest in the evidence he discarded because it was abandoned
property.  Abel is not a third-party consent case.
Coolidge expressly declares itself not to be a consent search case in the opinion: 
“we need not consider the petitioner’s . . . argument that Mrs. Coolidge could not or
did not ‘waive’ her husband’s constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”212  During an interview with police officers in her home, Mrs. Coolidge,
in order to exonerate her husband the murder suspect, delivered evidence to the police
on her own volition.213  The Court likened the case to a situation where someone, on
their own accord, brings evidence forward to the police.214  Using this reasoning, the
Court determined that there was no search.215  Coolidge, therefore, is not a third-party
consent case.216
Hill is not a consent case either.  Police officers mistakenly arrested someone
whom they believed to be the defendant, and the police conducted a search incident
to arrest.217  The Court ruled that the police could validly search the apartment as if
they had arrested the correct person.218  Hill is an incident to arrest case with a touch of
police mistake; in fact, the word “consent” does not appear anywhere in the opinion.219
Frazier is the case that comes closest to validating a third-party consent search. 
There is a subtle difference, however, between the search conducted in Frazier and
a true third-party consent search.220  The police officers in Frazier were conducting
an investigation against the defendant’s cousin, Rawls.221  Rawls gave the police his
consent to search a bag owned by the defendant, but Rawls was also using the bag
and the bag was at Rawls’s house.222  The officers found the defendant’s clothes in
211 See id.
212 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
213 Id. at 446, 487.
214 Id. at 487 (“Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own initiative, sought out her husband’s
guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as evidence against him,
there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been admissible
in evidence.”).
215 Id. at 487–90.
216 Interestingly, Justice Thomas, in his separate Randolph dissent, expressed his opinion
that the case should have been controlled by Coolidge because Randolph’s wife basically gave
the evidence to the police when she led them straight to the bedroom. Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 145–48 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The general search occurred only after
a warrant was obtained based on the evidence presented to the police by Randolph’s wife.
Id. at 107 (majority opinion).
217 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 799 (1971).
218 Id. at 802.
219 See id. passim.
220 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 45.
221 Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
222 Id.
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the bag as well, and they seized them.223  The seizure was lawful because the search
was lawful, and the search was lawful because the police officers had consent from
the person targeted by the search.224  Furthermore, the search could have been ruled
incident to a valid arrest, relegating the consent issue moot.  The consent in Frazier
is distinguishable from typical third-party consent because the consent in Frazier
came from the person targeted by the search.225  Frazier is a consent case, but not
a third-party consent case.
Schneckloth itself is not a third-party consent case for the same reason as Frazier:
the person who gave consent was a target of the search.226  When a consenting party
is also a target of the search, no third-party consent has been rendered.  Because Abel,
Frazier, Coolidge, Hill and Schneckloth can each be distinguished from a true third-
party consent search, as occurred in Matlock, the Court’s use of these cases is inappro-
priate to show that a Fourth Amendment waiver standard never existed.
The Court also ignores cases like Stoner that explicitly state that a Fourth Amend-
ment waiver standard exists.227  The Stoner Court ruled that “it was the petitioner’s
constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk’s . . . .  It was a
right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive.”228  Clearly, some form of
waiver standard applied to the Fourth Amendment.
The demotion of the Fourth Amendment and the inappropriate application of
precedent, combined with the disregard for cases that did apply a waiver standard to
the Fourth Amendment, allowed the Court to make waiver disappear.  Because the
Court abandoned a waiver standard by misconstruing precedent, the Matlock Court
had little trouble rationalizing the validity of third-party consent in the first case actu-
ally raising and resolving the issue first raised in Amos.229  The Matlock Court acted
as if the issue had already been decided by simply citing Frazier, Schneckloth, and
Coolidge for the proposition that third-party consent had already been validated.230
D. Summary
In its first decision truly validating third-party consent, the Supreme Court in
Matlock had no trouble because Schneckloth had eliminated waiver from the Fourth
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 44–45.
226 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
227 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
228 Id.
229 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1974).
230 In fact neither party brought up the issue during litigation. Id. at 169 (“It has been
assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant
of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant.”).
Everyone assumed that third-party consent was valid. Id. Presumably the Court mentioned
Amos in order to tidy up the case law and close the door on any future arguments against third-
party consent legitimacy. See id. at 169–71.
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Amendment lexicon and had inaccurately claimed that third-party consent had already
been validated in cases like Coolidge and Frazier.  Furthermore, the police officers
did not need a warrant because the warrant requirement had disintegrated in favor of
a general reasonableness model of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which third-
party consent is a reasonable type of search.  The result is a weaker Fourth Amendment
for any person who shares his privacy.  The current privacy regime and the Rodriguez
decision exacerbate the weakening of the Fourth Amendment because they create
a broad universe of potential third-party consenters.  In light of the weaker Fourth
Amendment generated by the Court’s decisions in the third-party consent context, the
Court should take steps to rehabilitate the Fourth Amendment to give efficacy to its
privacy protecting values.
III. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Typically, when one searches for solutions to doctrinal problems, a dichotomy of
choices emerge: nuclear options and pragmatic options.231  Nuclear options achieve
goals by making wholesale changes in doctrine, whereas pragmatic options achieve
goals by working within existing doctrine.  Nuclear options make themselves useful
by showing a design for an ideal world and shedding light on what may otherwise be
opaque goals.  Nuclear options are not practical and they inevitably fail because they
are radical departures from existing law and express the ideal world as seen by only
a few people.  Ultimately, too few people are willing to turn the key and push the big
red button on any one nuclear option.  Pragmatic options, however, are practical be-
cause they can garner wide support by not ruffling too many feathers.  Offered below
are two options: one nuclear, to clarify this Note’s goals for Fourth Amendment third-
party consent search jurisprudence, and the other pragmatic, to offer a practical solution
to solve some of the inequities of third-party consent searches.
A. Nuclear Option: The Abolition of Third-Party Consent
To suggest that third-party consent should be eliminated is not too overreaching
considering that scholars have suggested the elimination of consent searches gener-
ally.232  The doctrinal justifications are different for eliminating third-party consent
while preserving consent generally.  The obvious distinction between consent gener-
ally and third-party consent is the relationship between the consenting party and the
consequences of a search.  When a targeted party consents, he is waiving his own
Fourth Amendment right and subjecting himself to potential criminal consequences. 
When a third party consents, he is waiving another’s Fourth Amendment right and
subjecting someone else to potential criminal consequences.
231 Of course, in the first instance, not everyone will see a problem, and even if they do,
they may not want to fix it.
232 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 11, at 78–80; Strauss, supra note 15, at 271–72.
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In reality, to say that a third-party consents in his “own right” is a matter of
semantics.  The Matlock rationale is that police officers are breaching the third party’s
privacy, which happens to be shared by another.  In practice, the police officer’s ob-
jective is to breach the targeted party’s privacy with the permission of the third party
in order to gather evidence to be used at trial against the targeted party.   The third
party has no skin in the game and, therefore, should not be permitted to play—or,
in other words, consent.
This reality is particularly acute given the fact that the Supreme Court pur-
posefully shifted the Fourth Amendment’s focus from property to privacy to increase
Fourth Amendment protections.233  In a property regime, one would expect that the
relationship of the consenter to the targeted property would be the appropriate point
of analysis because a property interest is being protected.  In a privacy regime, where
the individual’s privacy is the interest being protected, the Court’s analysis should
focus on the privacy interest targeted by the police, meaning the targeted party’s in-
terest in keeping private what the police intend to find.  To allow a third party to con-
sent to an intrusion on another’s privacy is to ignore police objectives in obtaining
consent, which are to avoid Fourth Amendment warrant implications and to find in-
criminating evidence for use at trial.
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment intended an uninterested objective party—
the magistrate or some other judicial officer—to sanction by warrant invasions into a
citizen’s property (now privacy) interest because police officers, given their enthusiasm
for crime-solving, cannot fully be trusted to adhere to the amendment’s values.234  The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to blunt police efforts to invade privacy.  Targeted
party consent can exist in harmony with the Fourth Amendment’s purpose of restraining
police enthusiasm because the targeted party will be equally enthused over keeping the
police out as the police are about getting in.  But, because the third party has no appar-
ent interest in refusing consent, the third party has less incentive and enthusiasm for
objecting to a search request.  Third parties cannot perform the Fourth Amendment
duties of the magistrate or the targeted party as combatants to police enthusiasm.
By no means does the elimination of third-party consent require police to obtain
the consent of every targeted party of a search.  In cases where there are many targets
with common authority over the area to be searched, any one targeted party could
consent to a search of the areas over which he has common authority.  Other Fourth
Amendment doctrines, such as the plain view doctrine, would allow police officers
to seize items of evidence so long as those items were not discovered by an officer’s
unauthorized entering of an area over which the consenting party had no common
authority.235  For example, if the targeted party had common authority to a hallway
233 See Bascuas, supra note 137, at 733–37.
234 See Strauss, supra note 15, at 244–53.
235 For a discussion of Randolph’s implications on the plain view doctrine, see Stephanie
M. Godfrey & Kay Levine, Much Ado About Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits Third
Party Consent, 42 TULSA L. REV. 731, 748–49 (2007).
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to which the other targets’ bedrooms were connected and the doors to those rooms
were open with drugs in plain view, then the police could enter the room and seize
those drugs.  This outcome is consistent with the Fourth Amendment because a tar-
geted party was given the opportunity to protect his interests and object to a search
but chose to waive his own right.  The fact that police found incriminating evidence
against another party is incidental to a valid search.  In this respect, abolishing third-
party consent does not hinder police efforts to curb group criminality.
The implication of abolishing third-party consent, while allowing evidence against
a non-consenter to be validly seized during a general consent search, would be that the
defendant who did not consent to the search that produced the evidence being used
against him could challenge that evidence on the grounds that the person who con-
sented was not the target of the search.  How would courts determine whether the con-
senting party was in fact the target of the search?  The court would analyze the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the police reasonably believed they would
find incriminating evidence to be used against the consenting party.  This standard
is lower than probable cause—and must be—because requiring the police to have
probable cause before requesting consent would render moot the purpose of a consent
search: to search without a warrant in circumstances where a warrant is unlikely to
issue because the police have no probable cause.236  Once probable cause is established,
consent is unnecessary.
Even though third parties would not be able to consent to police searches targeting
their roommates, the abolition of third-party consent does not change the holding
of cases like Coolidge.  Third parties with the desire to snitch on their law-breaking
roommates could simply deliver incriminating evidence directly to police or coop-
erate with police officers in their efforts to obtain a warrant.
Abolishing third-party consent would reestablish waiver as a meaningful Fourth
Amendment principle.  Reestablishing waiver by abolishing third-party consent would
not require the Court to write another Miranda-like opinion.  The Court’s elimination
of waiver in Schneckloth enabled the Court to easily validate third-party consent in
Matlock, but overruling Matlock and its progeny would not affect Schneckloth’s
“voluntariness” standard for Fourth Amendment consent.  Abolishing third-party con-
sent would simply require a targeted party to give “voluntary” consent while render-
ing invalid any third-party consent.  Abolishing third-party consent would also go a
long way to strengthening the Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy, vindicat-
ing a citizen’s ability to keep the government out of his business, even if he takes on
a roommate.
236 Probable cause must “amount[] to more than a bare suspicion,” but the standard just
iterated would permit a “bare suspicion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009).
But see, Bascuas, supra note 137, at 775–80 (suggesting probable cause be strictly enforced).
Again, this Note does not look to curtail basic consent search doctrine because individuals
should have a right to waive their rights.
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B. Pragmatic Option: Randolph Refined, Targeted Party Primacy
The pragmatic option requires courts to use Randolph as a springboard for re-
straining, if not abolishing, third-party consent search doctrine.  The Ninth Circuit
took the first major step in accomplishing this goal in Murphy, and some of the steps
taken by the Ninth Circuit are reflected in this discussion.237
The major doctrinal step the Court needs to take is to eliminate the widely shared
social expectations test.  The test’s use of reasonableness is misplaced, brings con-
fusion to the Fourth Amendment, and is subject to innumerable interpretations, which
renders it useless as an adequate protector of privacy interests.238  Randolph correctly
assumes that something is different when the targeted party is present.  The differ-
ence is the risk assumed by the targeted party.  By adjusting the assumption of the
risk doctrine and abandoning widely shared social expectations, the Court can easily
strengthen the Fourth Amendment by limiting third-party consent searches, and thus
reconciling problems in third-party consent doctrine created in Randolph.
This adjustment would require the Court to rule that no assumption of the risk
is taken when the target of the search is present at the location to be searched.239  This
step makes sense because it is difficult to assume a risk when you are present to pre-
vent the harm the risk entails.  When roommate A is home, he can prevent roommate
B from invading his privacy or allowing others to invade his privacy.  No risk exists
for A when he is home because he is there to thwart the harm potentially realized from
taking the risk.  Establishing that no assumption of the risk is taken when the target
of a search is present at the targeted search area when police arrive to search would
create a targeted party primacy standard where police officers would be required to
obtain consent from a targeted party but could obtain consent from a third party if the
targeted party is not “present.”
To give efficacy to the targeted party primacy standard, the definition of “present”
would need to be broad in order to avoid decisions like Henderson, Rodriguez, and
Matlock where a present targeted party is ignored.240  The definition of “present”
would include any location on the property subjected to the search.  This would mean
that police officers would be required to obtain consent from a targeted party when that
237 United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (2008).
238 See Adrienne Wineholt, Note, Georgia v. Randolph: Checking Potential Defendants’
Fourth Amendment Rights at the Door, 66 MD. L. REV. 475, 491–93 (2007). For a good
critique of the social expectations test, see Alissa C. Wetzel, Comment, Georgia v. Randolph:
A Jealously Guarded Exception—Consent and the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
499, 511–14 (2006).
239 See C. Dan Black, Note, Georgia v. Randolph: A Murky Refinement of the Fourth
Amendment Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 321, 331, 333 (2007); Wineholt,
supra note 238, at 491–93.
240 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974); United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008); Jason E. Zakai, You Say Yes,
But Can I Say No? The Future of Third-Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 455–58 (2007).
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party is located anywhere on the property, inside or out.  The effect of such a targeted
party primacy standard, had it been applied in Matlock, Rodriguez, or Henderson,
would have been a search request by police officers to the targeted party.
The definition of “present” would also need to include police custody under any
circumstances.  One of the concerns the Court has had with requiring targeted party
consent is that the Court does not want to unduly burden the police officers in the field
by requiring them to find a non-present defendant, wherever he is in the world.241  Re-
quiring officers to request consent from a targeted party in custody does not invoke
this concern because the police know exactly where to find a targeted party in cus-
tody.  Including police custody in the definition of “present” removes all concerns
about police tactics designed to remove the defendant from the targeted search area.
One safeguard that would need to be implemented to prevent removal by police
officers would be that police officers may not validly perform a third-party consent
search when they have actual knowledge that the defendant would not be present at the
time of their arrival.  Actual knowledge regarding the absence of the targeted party
amounts to constructive removal.  At trial, the burden should belong to the defendant to
prove actual knowledge so as not to burden the police officers into explaining at every
trial why they did not know the defendant would not be present.  This rule would
overrule cases like Groves where the defendant expressly objects only to have his
objection become irrelevant when law enforcement officers come back later.242
Another safeguard that would need to be implemented to blunt police enthusiasm
would be to strengthen the effect of an objection to a request to consent.243  The Ninth
Circuit took this step in Murphy, holding that an express objection renders a subse-
quent search invalid as to the objecting party.244  No must mean no the first time. 
Police officers should not be allowed to cajole and badger a person into consent or
circumvent a previous objection by finding a more willing resident.245  Once an ex-
press objection is given, police officers would need a warrant to perform a search with
regard to the subject matter of the denied consent search.  This bar on asking for
consent after an objection would last infinitely for that subject matter.
Establishing a targeted party primacy standard for third-party consent searches
would vindicate the targeted party’s Fourth Amendment rights while not overburden-
ing law enforcement officers in the field by allowing them to obtain consent from a
third party when they had no knowledge that the targeted party would be absent.  This
arrangement can align with the assumption of the risk doctrine if that doctrine is ad-
justed to reflect the fact that the targeted party assumes the risk only when he is not
241 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006).
242 See United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
243 United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124–25 (2008); see Maclin, supra note 11,
at 80–81 (“I propose that whenever a person objects or refuses to provide consent, as Randolph
did, that refusal should bar further attempts by the police to seek consent.”).
244 Murphy, 516 U.S. at 1124–25.
245 See Maclin, supra note 11, at 81–82.
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“present.”  “Present” would be defined broadly to include any location on the targeted
property and police custody in order to give the targeted party a meaningful right and
prevent police tactics designed to circumvent the targeted party’s Fourth Amendment
right.  Requiring that police officers not have actual knowledge that the targeted party
will be absent when they arrive and request third-party consent also would prevent
police tactics designed to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.  Preventing police
cajoling and badgering by infusing objections with infinite utility and finality would
prevent police abuse.
CONCLUSION
When the Court first validated third-party consent searches in Matlock, it acted
as if nothing momentous had occurred.  To the contrary, the Court substantively
changed the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment by confirming with little discussion
what the lower courts had assumed:  true third-party consent is constitutionally valid. 
Third-party consent does not comport with our current notions of Fourth Amendment
values because individuals may be subjected to searches authorized by uninterested
third parties, circumventing the targeted party’s expectation of privacy.  Georgia v.
Randolph can be a springboard to attain a better Fourth Amendment, one that does
not recognize or, alternatively, severely restricts third-party consent.  But, the widely
shared social expectations test is unlikely to do the bulk of the work, and if it does, the
weakness of the test will make the protections gained tenuous at best.
Some form of waiver standard is necessary to protect Fourth Amendment rights. 
Abolishing third-party consent would establish the strictest form of waiver standard;
however, the prospects of such a result in the Supreme Court are highly unlikely.  A
more likely alternative to the abolition of third-party consent is a targeted-party primacy
standard, under which first priority to object to a search belongs to the target of the
search if the target is “present.”
A targeted-party primacy standard would rationalize third-party consent doctrine
and repair Randolph’s doctrinal damage by adjusting the assumption of the risk doc-
trine to account for the difference in assumed risk between a present and nonpresent
defendant.  Because a targeted party’s interest in avoiding a search is directly adverse
to the government’s interest in searching, and is stronger than a third-party’s similar
interest in avoiding a search, a targeted-party primacy standard would enhance the
efficacy of Fourth Amendment values by more adequately balancing the government
enthusiasm for crime solving, with the consequences of relinquishing privacy by re-
quiring a targeted party, when present, to make the weighty decision to consent.  A
targeted-party primacy standard would be a bright line rather than a “fine line” rule,
easily applied by lower courts and easily understood by law enforcement officers and
citizens alike.  A targeted-party primacy standard would provide law enforcement
officers in the field, without overburdening them, the tools they need to solve crimes
while eliminating the incentives they may have had to employ tactics designed to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment.
